Research on the Mechanism of Venture Capital on Cash Dividend of Listed Companies—An Empirical Analysis Based on the Perspective of Corporate Governance

YU-RONG GUAN, KUN-PENG ZHOU

Abstract


In this paper, principal component analysis is used to weigh the level of corporate governance and an intermediary effect model is built based on the perspective of corporate governance. It is found that the cash dividend payment propensity and payment level of listed companies with venture capital shareholders are significantly higher than that of listed companies without venture capital holdings, and the higher the shareholding ratio of venture capital to listed companies, the higher the cash dividend payment level. The effect of venture investment on cash dividend is realized by improving corporate governance level. The higher the proportion of venture investment in listed companies, the more obvious the improvement of corporate governance is, thereby reducing the agency cost of the company, which is manifested in the improvement of cash dividend payment level of listed companies.

Keywords


Dividend, Corporate Governance, Venture Capital, Intermediary Effect, Agency Cost.Text


DOI
10.12783/dtem/icem2019/31239

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