A Game Analysis of Iron Ore Right Investment between Steel Enterprises and the Government Based on Static Incomplete Information

Yu-shan CHEN, Tao DUAN

Abstract


Against the background of increasing demand for iron ore resources in Chinese steel enterprises and based on game tools, this paper builds a game equilibrium between steel enterprises and the government under the condition of non-competitive mining rights transfer. It is discussed two equalization strategies, and finds that trading opportunities for Linear Strategy are greater than opportunities for the one-price equilibrium strategy between steel enterprises and the governments in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. At the same time, investment efficiency of linear strategy steel enterprises will be better investment efficiency than one-price equilibrium strategy.

Keywords


Mining right, Transfer, Iron ore, Game model, Equilibrium


DOI
10.12783/dtcse/cscme2019/32581

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